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Abstract 
As part of health sector reform, most developing countries are in the process of standardizing and integrating various vertical reporting 
systems. Nevertheless, the pressure resulting from the vertical systems supported by donors renders the integration goal challenging 
and unachievable. While studies have argued for the heterogeneity of interests and donors’ multiple needs as the major causes, this 
paper argue for more critical analysis of the problem. The paper contribute by arguing for the need to understand the main actors 
involved, in terms of their resources and rules as they are implicated in HIS integration. Using an empirical case and Structuration 
theory concepts, we identified dialectic power relations between the actors resulting from control of resources and rules. The need to 
build shared meanings of the integration process through communication approaches; and to distribute control of the integrated HIS, 
facilitating ‘tapping on’ the resources available to the actors is discussed. 
Keywords 
Standardization, Health Information Systems, Integration, Vertical Programs, Structuration Theory 
Introduction 
In this era, popularly acclaimed as an information society age, use of information in the service sectors is seen as a factor 
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of service provision. In the health sector, health information guides mobilization 
and allocation of resources, prioritization of health programmes and research, and improve efficiency and effectiveness 
of health programmes (Kanjo et al., 2009). Use of health information in low-income countries with high disease burdens 
is perceived as a mechanism towards optimization of resources and for the management of interventions geared towards 
reversing the diseases trends. However, these interventions have attracted multiplicity of so called development 
partners/donors operating with a condition of ‘proper’ management of their funds through quasi-independent programs 
called vertical health programs. The programs maintain separate and uncoordinated information system alongside the 
national HIS. Consequently, the HIS in most countries is rendered dysfunctional, fragmented and unable to provide the 
much needed health information (Chilundo, 2004; Braa and Humberto, 2007; WHO, 2006). 
As a remedy, most countries are standardizing and integrating the HIS as part of the broader health sector reforms. 
Whereas some countries have managed to standardize and integrate some of the vertical programs in the national HIS 
(Braa et al., 2005; Haulage et al., 2005), keeping the vertical programs rely and use the new system has proved 
challenging (Haulage et al., 2005). This makes the goal for HIS integration illusive and unattainable with fragmentation 
creeping back in the picture, even before the closure of the project. Though a number of research studies on the HIS in 
developing countries, not many of them have critically analysed the issue of fragmentation after integration. Some few 
studies have argued for the national HIS not meeting the data needs of the health vertical programs, rigidity of the 
national systems where standards are ‘cast in stone’, bureaucracy in incorporating new program’s requirements in the 
existing system, multiplicity of data needs posed by donors on the vertical programs (Sheikh, 2005; Aanestad et al. 2005; 
Chilundo, 2004). To contribute to this, the paper emphasize the need to understand the two main groups of actors 
involved in the process (i.e. the national HIS authorities and the vertical programs supported by donors) in terms of the 
resources and rules available to them; and their implication in the standardization and integration venture.  
Our focus being the need to analyze the relationship between the national HIS authorities and the vertical programs in 
terms of their resources and rules, we find Structuration Theory (ST) concepts relevant for this respect. According to 
Giddens, actors draw on allocative and authoritative resources to mediate their actions (Giddens, 1984). Allocative 
resources refer to material objects which actors draw upon to get things done (redesign a new tool, exert control over 
others). On the other hand, authoritative resources refer to non-material factors (such as status, formal authority or 
hierarchical position) which enable command over other human beings. The main actors in the context of our study carry 
with them both allocative and authoritative resources as they engage in the process of standardizing and integrating the 
HIS. Our argument is that, these resources generate power which underpins the actors’ ability to effect changes 
(transformative capacity) in the context of HIS integration which ultimately challenge the whole process, rendering it 
ineffective (ibid). Therefore, our paper strives to meet the following objectives (1) to analyze the power relations that 
exist between the two main actors resulting from the ownership and control of resources and its implication on the HIS 
integration (2) to draw on the case and propose strategies to deal with the challenges. 
The empirical underpinning is the ongoing effort to standardize and integrate the HIS in Zanzibar, as part of the broader 
healthcare system reforms. Supported by Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) the HIS restructuring  
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project is done within the Health Information Systems Programme (HISP), which operates in many other developing 
countries (Braa et al., 2005). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent section we present concepts 
from Structuration theory forming the basis for analysis and discussion. The research context and the methodology 
employed are presented next, followed by the case description. Analysis and discussion of the research findings is then 
set forth. The paper ends with a conclusion section presenting implications of the study and final remarks. 
Structuration Theory Concepts 
Giddens developed structuration theory (ST) as a general theory of social systems. In the information systems (IS) 
research, ST has been used in theory development and analysis of empirical case studies on organizational and social 
issues related to IS implementation and use. Kouroubali (2002) used the theory to study implementation of information 
system in a health care environment; Chisalita (2006) used ST to understand use of IS technology in a public sector. In 
this paper, we employ ST in a healthcare environment flooded with multiplicities of vertical HIS supported by donors.  
Structuration is a social process that involves reciprocal interaction of human actors and structural features of the 
organization (Giddens, 1984). ST aims to explain social practices across space and time by viewing actions and social 
structures as linked by their interdependency. Social structures are defined as rules and resources in the human mind. 
When acting in a social situation human actors draw on the resources and rules between them which facilitate or 
constrain their actions. Therefore, rules and resources mediate human actions and in their use they are continuously 
reaffirmed or changed by human agents. Giddens identifies three dimensions of structure, which he terms signification, 
domination and legitimation linked with corresponding dimensions of agency, described as communication, power and 
sanctions. The interaction (agency) is however, mediated by interpretive schemes, facilities (resources) and norms 
respectively. 
When human actors communicate in interaction they draw upon different interpretive schemes, defined as “stocks of 
knowledge” about what actors are doing and why they are doing it. Actors employ these interpretive schemes in order to 
make sense of the interactions, to understand them. By employing the interpretive schemes they produce and reproduce 
structures of signification or meaning. Giddens identified two types of resources - allocative and authoritative resources. 
Allocative resources refer to material objects which actors draw upon to get things done (e.g. design a new data tool 
standard, exert control over others). On the other hand, authoritative resources refer to non-material factors (such as 
status or hierarchical position) which enable command over other human beings. These resources generate power which 
underpins a person’s ability to effect change (transformative capacity) in his or her social environment. (Callinicos and 
Giddens, 1985) defined power as the capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course. As 
such it is the “can” which mediates between ‘intentions and want’ and the actual realization of the outcomes sought after 
(ibid). The ability of human actors to draw on resources to exercise power over other actors constitute to organizational 
structures of domination. Nevertheless, there is always a possibility for the other actors, to whom power has been wielded 
to act to change a particular structure of domination, leading to what is referred to as the dialectic of control. With the 
dialectic of control, Gidden argues that, there is always some resources available to humans with which to act in ways 
that counteract or offset the effect of a social pressure. 
“all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of 
their superiors” (Giddens, 1984 p16]. 
The rules and resources in general mediate and constrain human action, while at the same time they are reaffirmed 
through being used by the human actors. The role of human actors to reaffirm the structural properties is highlighted by 
the recognition that human agents are purposeful, knowledgeable, reflexive and active. 
“All social actors, all human beings are highly 'learned' in respect of knowledge which they possess and apply, 
in the production and reproduction of day-to-day social encounters (Giddens, 1984 p22].". 
Social actors as knowledgeable agents account for their reflexivity capacity to routinely observe and understand what 
they are doing while they are doing it. (Braa and Hedberg, 2002) presented an example on this regard where health 
workers attributed institutional trust to the existing routine reporting systems and saw them as means to confirm social 
contracts. The consequence of that was the tendency of the health workers to resist the new ‘improved’ standards. 
The continuity of social reproduction is based on the duality of structure and with the reflexive monitoring of social 
activity by the agents. Regular actions of knowledgeable and reflexive agents establish patterns of interaction that 
become standardized practices in organizations. However, the purposive actions by the social actors do not imply perfect 
control of action. There are also unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of action (Jones, 1999). 
Unintended consequences refers to the consequences that would not have taken place if a social actor had acted 
differently but that are not what the actor had intended to happen (Giddens, 1984). For any planned organizational 
change, the consequences that escape the intention of the planned change are considered unintended. For instance, the 
plan of a healthcare organization could be to standardize and integrate the HIS and unintended consequence could be 
ending up with more fragmentation. 
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Our study draw on the ST concepts to describe how the main actors as knowledgeable, purposive and reflexive agents 
draw on the resources and rules available to them to exercise power as they engage in the standardization and integration 
initiative. As we shall show, this spawns structures of domination leading to unintended consequences rendering the 
integration goal challenging and unattainable.  
Research Settings and Methods 
The research was done in Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous region within the United Republic of Tanzania, with two main 
islands, Unguja and Pemba. Zanzibar is divided into five administrative regions, each with two districts, making a total of 
ten districts in the entire region. Zanzibar maintains her own health system administrated by a semi-autonomous Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW). Alongside the health system is an information system called Health 
Management Information System (HMIS), meant to provide information support to all decision making processes of the 
entire ministry. In this paper, the term ‘Health Information System (HIS)’ is used to refer to the HMIS and the term 
‘National HIS authorities’ is used to refer to the national level MoHSW department, responsible for the HIS. 
The research is based on efforts supported by DANIDA to standardize and integrate the HIS in Zanzibar. The 
implementation of the project is done within the HIS programme called HISP. HISP is a South-South-North collaborative 
HIS programme comprising of a number of countries from Africa, Asia and Europe. The HISP team in Zanzibar (authors 
are members of the team) in collaboration with other stakeholders (the MoHSW, vertical programs and donors) started to 
engage in the standardization and integration of the HIS since 2005. For more information refer to (Nyella, 2007). The 
study was conducted using longitudinal case study based on interpretive philosophical assumption. Interpretive research 
aims at producing an understanding of the context of the IS, and the process whereby the IS influences and is influenced 
by the context (Walsham, 1993). The choice of the interpretive study was catalysed by the need to understand the actors 
in terms of their resources and the implications these resources in the context of HIS integration. 
The research was carried out in four districts in Unguja and one in Pemba within two periods - June to November, 2006 
and in April 2009. The empirical materials were gathered through actual engagement in the activities of standardizing 
and integrating the HIS which included customization of software tool, redesign of data formats, trainings. Other sources 
included formal and informal interviews, focused group discussions, document analysis such as the Health Sector 
Reforms Strategic Plans and attendance in meetings and workshops.  
In the first fieldwork, 38 informants were interviewed – 19 from Pemba and 19 from Unguja Island. Among the 
informants included district medical and health officers, health programs managers and central HIS officials. The second 
field research was a follow up meant to learn changes that had taken place after a period of time. In this round data was 
collected through interviews and attendance in consultative stakeholder meetings discussing integration of all vertical 
programs systems in the national HIS. This time 26 informants were interviewed in four districts in Unguja. The 
fieldwork formed the basis for understanding the national HIS officers’ efforts to acquire both material resources and 
political support to ensure HIS integration. 
Case Description - Standardization and Integration of the HIS  
In 2002, Zanzibar initiated a health sector reform process, seeking to decentralize planning, prioritization and integration 
of services to the district level (ZHSRSPii, 2006). Supported by the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), the government and other partners; the reform process sought to strengthen among many other things the 
HIS, to provide information support to decentralized sections of the health system. Hitherto, the HIS was characterised 
by scarcity of resources, gaps in data collection tools, poor analysis of data, fragmentation towards the vertical reporting 
systems, poor feedback, lack of motivation and limited information use (Sheikh, 2005). The aim of the HIS restructuring 
was to review existing systems of data collection to remove overlaps, gaps, integration of similar standards, and ensure 
that all data is captured in a district data repository accessible to all stakeholders.  
The context of the HIS restructuring is described below focusing on the control of resources, followed by the empirical 
description of the HIS restructuring process highlighting the implication of the resources on the integration initiative. 
The Context of the HIS Restructuring - Ownership and Control of Resources 
The healthcare Health services in Zanzibar are delivered through directorates of the Ministry of Health and specialized 
vertical programs such as Reproductive and Child Health (RCH), Zanzibar AIDS control program (ZACP), the Malaria 
control program (ZMCP) and Tuberculosis (TB) and Leprosy control program (ZPRP, 2002). The main sources of health 
sector financing are donor funds and fiscal operations of the government. The government financing is derived from 
general tax revenue sources. However, according to a study by the African Development Bank (ADB), revenues 
generated by the health sector itself cover less than a half of one percent of annual health sector expenditures and account 
for insignificant share of total government revenues (MoHSW, 2003). Furthermore, the health sector public expenditure 
review7 for 2006 shows that government contribution accounted for 29% of spending in the sector in financial year 
2004/05, while development partners accounted for the balance of 71% (ZHSRSPii, 2006). 
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DANIDA is one of the main donors within health sector whose resource support base is large and respected (DDAT, 
2007). Other partners in terms of healthcare financing include Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the 
African Development Bank, and the United States. Most of the donors prefer disbursement of their funds and other 
resources directly to the specialized vertical health programs to ensure ‘proper’ management and use of their funds.  
Technical health programmes in Zanzibar remain highly verticalised, with some commanding significant 
external resources. This has resulted in a regrettable situation whereby their planning and reporting activities 
are in some cases more closely aligned with funders than the MOHSW as a whole (ZHSRSPii, 2006 p26). 
However, coordination of these donors/partners and the funds provided is problematic. Though there are many activities 
in the health sector being funded by donors (vertical health programs being part of them), there is near absence of 
disclosure by donors on disbursement schedules, time frame of assistance, modalities of procurement, etc (MoHSW, 
2003). Allocation of the existing resources in Zanzibar has largely been driven by external, development partner 
priorities (ibid). As part of the health sector reforms, the government seek to build a framework for coordinating the 
partner’s support, so as to ensure transparency and accountability in addition to directing the resources support to the 
government priority cost-effective health service delivery interventions. 
”The issue of effective management of resources and development partner coordination is critical because 
implementation success of the reforms will depend to a large extent on development partners’ support. It is 
therefore paramount that concerted efforts be made as part of the reform process on how to coordinate the 
inflow of development partner support so as to ensure transparency and accountability in addition to directing 
the resources support to priority cost-effective health service delivery interventions and activities” (ZHSRSPii, 
2006 p19). 
However as presented in the ZHSRSPii (2006), the issue of integration which would enable pooling and well coordinated 
allocation of the resources is a potentially thorny one, with vested interests working against reform efforts. Nonetheless, 
as further stressed out in the (ibid), the efficiency gains and potential equity gains of rationalisation in certain areas are 
difficult to ignore, and the coming period will see renewed efforts by the central MOHSW to integrate and coordinate 
central support activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Flow of funds and other resources (Source: Fieldwork) 
As shown in Figure1, almost all the donors’ funds go directly to the vertical health programs to support program 
healthcare activities including the program based HIS. The national HIS however, depends on the very limited 
government funds disbursed through the Ministry of Health. The impact of the resources available to vertical programs 
for establishment and maintenance of their HIS is vivid for those with strong donor support. Such programs are 
characterised by strong management structure which is well resourced in terms of human and material resources 
(computers and software etc). Examples of such programs include Malaria, HIV/AIDS, EPI and TB & Leprosy.  
The subsequent section presents the HIS standardization and integration initiative, covering some of the programs which 
were involved and the way they responded to the new system. We show how programs managers drew on their resources 
and respond differently to the new system and how the national authorities used resources available to them to 
counterbalance the move. 
The HIS Restructuring Process 
Drawing on incremental and participatory approaches, the HIS restructuring process started by revision of existing 
datasets and definition of new ones. Based on the approach, the following datasets were included in the integration 
initiative: Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), Disease surveillance, Reproductive and child health (RCH), 
Sexually Transmission Infections (STI) & Human Immunogenicity Virus (HIV) dataset, and Maternity dataset. EPI had 
mainly two main datasets, one for monitoring provision of vaccination services and another one for disease surveillance. 
The vaccination dataset saw some minor changes during the revision process, leaving it more or less as it was but with a 
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mandate that its data should be captured in a common electronic database at the district level. In terms of control and 
support of this dataset by the EPI program, it was more or less vertical but with one important change – the data is 
captured in the common database giving access to all other stakeholders. However, the disease surveillance EPI dataset, 
being similar to the national Disease Surveillance dataset, were both standardized and integrated to form one dataset. 
Unlike the vaccination dataset, the mandate to integrate the surveillance datasets made EPI translate it as loosing control 
to their dataset.  Though the integrated dataset was running for a period of time (eight months) the EPI program kept on 
collecting data using their own dataset. As asserted by one official: 
“.. Until we are sure of getting our data, we can not abandon our system” (Manager, July, 2006) 
Malaria program is another health program with keen interest with the disease surveillance dataset. With a very strong 
donor support working towards reversing the malaria trends in the country, the program had a great need to monitor the 
various malaria interventions on the ground. The disease surveillance being the main source of the malaria data, the 
program was involved in the design and implementation stages. For instance, the program’s data manager was involved 
in conducting training for the new disease surveillance dataset (that included the malaria data). However, despite of the 
involvement the data manager designed a separate data collection tool behind the scene and rolled it out in some districts. 
When enquired of it, he stated: 
“They have taken out almost all the age group categories and left what they feel will satisfy their needs, but 
what about us?. So we designed it to show them how it should look like” (Manager, August 2006). 
However, when the national HIS officers learned of the practice, a decree was issued requiring the program to adhere on 
the agreed national data tool for disease surveillance. During the follow up field research (April 2009), the program was 
using the national surveillance tool.  
The Zanzibar Aids Control Program (ZACP) is another health program which despite of being involved in the process of 
designing new dataset for the program’s services (HIV & STI), kept on using their previous dataset tools separately. 
ZACP is one of the strong programs funded by different donors such as the Global fund, Centre for Disease Control 
(CDC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The program 
maintained its own fragmented HIS, one for VCT and another one for STI services. These subsystems were integrated 
into one dataset forming an ‘STI and HIV/AIDs’ dataset. The dataset was functional for more than six months with data 
routinely collected and collated from almost all health facilities providing the two services. Although most of the data 
was submitted to the districts and transmitted to higher levels, the data was not fetched and used by the ZACP. Instead, 
the program kept on depending entirely on their previous systems. The reason given was that the new dataset did not 
fulfil data requirements for program management and that it was not designed for the ZACP but for the national HIS. 
“The new tools are for the higher levels only; they can not help us in any way. We need more information 
compared to what is on the national HIS form. It is not designed for us” (Manager, July 2006) 
Though the program officers participated in the design process of the dataset, the participation as explained by one 
officer was meant to help the national HIS authorities get HIV/AIDS related data. As explicated by one national HIS 
officer, lack of trust by the vertical program of the capacity of national authorities to sustain the HIS was envisioned as 
one of the reasons: 
“……. we rely on donors in almost everything which sometimes lead to mistrust by the vertical programs of our 
capability to maintain and sustain the HI. For instance EPI are performing well because they have enough 
funds (from donors)”. (HIS officer, July 2006) 
This is further reinforced through a follow-up field visit (in April, 2009) by one of the authors 
The national HIS initiative has been funded by DANIDA for more than 90%. They (DANIDA) are not funding 
the HIS initiative alone but almost everything relating to heath sector reforms in Zanzibar (HIS officer, 2009). 
The follow-up visit revealed some efforts done by the national HIS to ensure all the vertical programs become part of the 
integration initiative. One of such efforts is consultative meetings by the national HIS which meant to enrol fully all the 
programs such as the Zanzibar AIDS Control Programme (ZACP), TB/Leprosy, Home Based Care (HBC) and the 
Preventive Mother to Child Transmission Programme (PMTCT) into the initiative. The national HIS management has a 
top level political support for integration of these vertical systems into the national HIS. This is based on the order issued 
by the national health principal secretary to all health programs requiring their HIS be integrated on the national data 
warehouse. The programs attended in a two days workshop which saw revision and harmonization of different data 
formats whose implementation is continuing up until the time of writing.  
We are done with the data review with all vertical programs with exception of TB-HIV data. We will soon be 
done with it once we get time (HIS officer, 2009). 
As stated earlier the national HIS integration initiative depends almost entirely on DANIDA support, however according 
to one official, the support has been halved since 2009. She further observed that if they will completely withdrew their 
support many things will crumble. 
So you can see that, if they will withdraw their support we will not be able to move alone and so many things 
will crumble (HIS officer, 2009). 
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However, the national HIS has different strategies so far in place to acquire support from different donors as asserted 
below: 
 We have a new donor (Italian cooperation) who has signed a two years support for HIS especially on capacity 
building and training (HIS officer, 2009). 
Furthermore the national HIS expect to mobilize and receive support from the vertical programs to sustain the integrated 
HIS: 
The fact that all programs will be integrated within national HIS, and the fact that each program has a 
component for HIS , then, we will be receiving some support from vertical programs that will facilitate activities 
relating to the national HIS (HIS officer, 2009). 
Whether the programs will remain ‘faithful’ to the new system after the implementation process; remains to be seen. 
Analysis and Discussion 
In this section we draw on concepts from Structuration theory to analyze the empirical materials. We start by the analysis 
the two main actors in the light of the resources available to them. The impact of the resources as they are drawn upon by 
the actors mediating their responses to the HIS integration is subsequently explored. This section ends by discussion of 
the strategies to counter the effect resulting from the ownership and control resources implicated in HIS integration. 
Analysis of the Resources Controlled by the Main Actors  
Zanzibar, the context of our study is a low income country, highly dependent on donors for social and economic 
development. The big share of the health sector budget is contributed by donors (ZHSRSPii, 2006). However as seen 
from our case, most of these resources are controlled by the donors (one of the main HIS actors) in terms of allocation 
and use (ibid). These resources generate power which underpins actors’ ability to effect changes in their operating social 
environment – health sector. For instance with a condition of ‘proper management’ most of the allocative resources 
(Giddens, 1984) are directed to vertically organized health programs (Figure 1). Though this can also account for the 
actors knowledgeable, reflexive and purposive characteristics, in terms of their decisions for proper management, this 
however does not imply perfect control of their actions. For, there are also unacknowledged conditions and unintended 
consequences of actions (Jones, 1999). For instance, as an unintended outcome of the vertically organized allocation of 
resources, is the deprivation of other health care services in terms of resources, which sometimes may paradoxically be 
the one to be given the first priority.  
Malaria health program, as described in (ZHSRSPii, 2006), utilized huge amounts of allocative resources compared to 
other health programs and services which are of relatively equal or more significance. The resources directed to these 
programs have significant effect on their HIS and on the initiative to integrate them in the mainstream HIS. More often, 
these vertical HIS consists of well organized management structure with both human and other allocative resources. 
These management structures are sometimes in conflict with the national HIS. This is exemplified by the TB & Leprosy 
program which maintains a totally different administrative structure upon which their HIS is built. As the result, this was 
taken as the reason for the TB/leprosy HIS to run separate from the mainstream HIS. 
The MoHSW authorities characterized by the meager allocative resources, is embarking on a process of coordinating the 
donor support to ensure proper allocation of the resources by targeting on the most priority areas in the healthcare 
system. Though the MoHSW authorities may be considered resourceful in terms of its authoritative power accounted for 
by its political mandate to coordinate the donors support, this is weakened by its meager allocative resources. As pointed 
out in (ibid), coordinating donors support is a potentially thorny issue, with vested interests working against the health 
sector reforms efforts. However, the MoHSW authorities as knowledgeable, purposeful and resourceful (political 
mandate) actor reaffirmed its position by arguing that the efficiency gains and potential equity gains of rationalization in 
certain areas are difficult to ignore, and the coming period will see renewed efforts by the central MOHSW to integrate 
and coordinate central support activities.  
The asymmetric ownership and control of resources depicted above shows how actors draw on resources to exercise 
power over other actors which ultimately constitute to organizational structures of domination. These structures of 
domination enacted in such a context of healthcare reforms initiatives which includes the HIS  standardization and 
integration renders the reform goals challenging and difficult to attain. We use the term asymmetric to emphasize a 
situation where one group of actors have more and different type of resources compared to another. The challenging part 
of such a context is the fact that each main actor has resources and knowledgeable enough to wield power over the other 
actor leading to the dialectic of control (Giddens, 1984). It is argued that there is always some resources available to 
humans with which to act in ways that counteract the effect of a social pressure (ibid). This further explains the failure of 
the effort by different countries to pool resources from the categorical health programs to the integrated HIS (Brown, 
2001). In the subsequent section we look at the effect of the resources on the HIS integration initiative. 
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Implication of the Resources on HIS Restructuring – Resources Mediated Power Tensions 
The standardization and integration initiative took place in such a context characterized by the asymmetric ownership and 
control of resources and rule system. The national HIS could be envisioned to have much of the authoritative resources 
depicted by their political will and mandate to standardize and integrate the HIS. On the other hands, the vertical 
programs seem to have more of the allocative resources (e.g.: funds, human resources, software and paper tools) 
available to them. Actors draw on these resources to exercise power and get things done (Giddens, 1984). The decision 
taken by one of the program officers to design a separate data collection tool behind the scene clearly depicts the 
transformative capacity of actors as they draw on the resources available to them. A lot of factors mediated such a 
decision and action, including funds and human resources to design and circulate them, stock of knowledge of how to 
design and implement the tool. The action of the program officer underscores the reflexive, purposeful and active trait of 
human actors; highlighting their frequent monitoring of their own actions and that of others.  
Similar action is represented by the decision of some program managers to run their old data tools alongside the 
standardized tool. This was attributed, partly by the allocative resources (funds to maintain their tools, excel based 
software tool etc) available to them and the knowledge of the vertical program managers of the economic status of the 
national HIS. The answer provided by the manager, of the need to be sure of continually getting their data from the 
national HIS, clearly depicts the reflexive and knowledgeable character of human agents. The HIV/AIDS program (with 
a number of donors behind it), is another program whose managers drew on their resources to mediate their response 
towards the national HIS standardization initiative. Though the managers were involved in designing and implementing a 
dataset tool for HIV, the program opted to rely on their previous systems. The response provided by the manager 
depicted their capacity to maintain their own systems, with an argument that the new dataset was meant for the national 
HIS data needs. 
The varied responses to the HIS standardization process by the vertical program managers, mediated by the resources 
available to them spawned structures of domination. However, according to Giddens, there is always a possibility for the 
other actors, to whom power has been wielded to act to change a particular structure of domination. To counteract or 
offset the power relations, the national HIS drew on the authoritative resources available to them. Using its authoritative 
power the national HIS officials resorted on participatory approaches such meetings and workshops to summon their 
rivals to resolve some of the problems related to their lack of allocative resources. This was evident by the mechanism 
used to solve lack of data collection tools problems. The national HIS immediately called a meeting summoning all the 
vertical programs including donors to deliberate and resolve the problem. Therefore, the national HIS tried to change the 
structure of domination by drawing on the authoritative resources available to them leading to the dialectic of control.  
The dialectic of control can further be explained by the renewed effort by the national HIS authorities to have all the 
programs integrated in the national HIS despite of its meagre allocative resources by striving hard to get support from 
donors to achieve her main goal. The decree issued by the national health principal secretary to all health programs 
requiring their HIS integrated on the national HIS further depicts the political pressure towards integration. The dialectic 
tensions resulting from the asymmetric ownership and control of resources render the integration goal challenging and 
sometimes unreachable. Neither the national HIS nor the vertical programs seem to have control of the whole process. 
For instance, when the vertical program managers are summoned to discuss integration issues they comply to the 
authority of the national HIS but when it comes to implementation which depends largely on allocative resources the 
national HIS authorities is found wanting. Instead, the control is automatically taken by the vertical programs as they 
draw on their resources to implement their own agenda.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Power tensions leading to unintended consequences  
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The ultimate result is the divergence from the main goal resulting to unintended consequences of even more 
fragmentation and duplication of efforts, data and tools standards. Running the old data and tools standards of the vertical 
programs alongside the new integrated system is a manifestation of more challenges and frustrations to practitioners at 
the local level as they are now confronted by both the new and the old standards all at once. Fig. 2, indicates the tension 
between the two main actors as one attempt for standardization and integration by drawing on the authoritative resources 
and the other actor backed by allocative resources strive to maintain the vertical HIS. The ultimate result is unintended 
consequences of unattained goal and more fragmented HIS. 
Unlike most of the studies on the issue of power in IS discourse treating power as stable, zero-sum and somehow 
negative (Kling and Iacono, 1984; Markus, 1983), our study conquers with Rolland and Aanestad (2003) who through 
the study of information infrastructures development showed that power is performed, dialectic, distributed, implicit and 
inscribed. We have shown how power is performed based on the capacity of the actors as knowledgeable and reflexive 
subjects to make a difference as they draw on the resources available to them. Furthermore, we have shown that other 
than power being wielded from a single actor, it is rather distributed and dialectical where every actor has some resources 
(authoritative or allocative). Inline with the concept of power as distributed we propose an approach towards HIS 
integration of the vertical HIS based on flexibility and distributed control. Further, we argue for the HIS standardization 
and integration venture be re-conceptualized as a process of creating new structures of meaning between the main actors 
mediated by communication processes.  
Proposed Approach – The Need for Distributed Control of the Integrated HIS 
The complex contextual realities of the health sector in low income countries as in our case provoke a lot of challenges in 
any efforts to change existing systems. These challenges results from the poor state of local authorities and the 
multiplicity of actors, rendering the context a battle ground where different competing and overlapping interests by the 
various actors are at play. This is epitomized by the tensions between the two main actors in the HIS integration resulting 
from the asymmetric ownership and control of resources. Paradoxically, neither side is in control in any strict sense, 
calling for a pragmatic approach in ensuring a workable solution. 
Our first proposal is the need to build meaning of the HIS standardization and integration process between the actors. 
From the outset of the project, actors have myriad of interests and agendas. We argue for the need to re-conceptualize the 
harmonization of these interests as a process of reshaping and creating structures of meaning. To achieve this, the 
interaction between the two actors through communication processes is of paramount importance. Communication 
mediated by the stock of knowledge of what can be considered as possible solution for the problem is necessary to 
achieve an integrated HIS, agreeable and shareable to the parties involved. As shown from our case, lack of proper 
communication between the actors lead to creation of structures of meaning which were in conflict with the main goal of 
integration. The argument by one of the HIV/AIDS officers that ‘his participation was meant to help the national HIS 
authorities get their data’ or ‘the new tools are for the higher levels only’ indicate a partial understanding of the whole 
aim of the integration process. A clear meaning of the dynamics and the outcome of the integration process should be 
built up through communication processes such as meetings and workshops involving the main actors.  
Coupled with the need to build meaning is the need to agree on how the integrated system should be constructed by 
taking the contextual particularities as a point of departure. As seen from our case study top level managerial control in a 
context of asymmetric ownership of resources confer little hope for integration. Alternatively we argue for a distributed 
control of the integrated HIS built on a modularised and flexible approach. By distributed control we mean a HIS system 
organized in such away that specific strong programs HIS are built as separate modules in the integrated HIS. For 
instance, HIV/AIDS, EPI and TB & Leprosy can be implemented as separate modules. This approach gives the program 
control and ownership of their module without compromising accessibility of the data by other actors. This is because all 
the system modules will be integrated in one HIS.  
An example from our case which worked well based on the approach is the Immunization dataset which is under the EPI 
program. The dataset was revised with strong collaboration with the EPI program managers. The managers were given 
leading role in the process of redesigning, testing and implementing the dataset in the health districts. Drawing on their 
resources they conducted trainings for the new data and tool standards for EPI and provision of supportive supervisions 
to districts and health facilities health officers. Furthermore, the program ensures that the data is captured in the 
integrated district data warehouse accessible to other actors including the national HIS authorities. In contrast to the HIV 
dataset where from the onset of redesigning the tool, control was under the national HIS authorities. The ownership and 
control of the dataset was in a sense pre-empted from the HIV management. Their involvement during the redesign phase 
was not clear as what was anticipated of them in terms of running and control of the new dataset. As the result, the 
dataset received limited support from the HIV program managers as they continued to use their previous datasets. The 
argument is that since the strong programs are quasi-independent operationally, the distributed control conforms to their 
operational nature by providing a partial control to the integrated HIS based on a modular structure. 
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Figure 3: Modularized integration approach based on the strong programs  
The distributed approach provides coordinating role to the national authorities and control of other modules which are not 
under the strong vertical programs. By drawing on HIS guidelines built based on the distributed control approach and 
agreed by the two main actors, the national authorities can accrue lots  of benefits by  tapping on the resources controlled 
by the vertical HIS to sustain the integrated HIS. The approach provides alternative solution to the problem of pooling 
resources from the categorical health programs to the integrated HIS (Brown, 2001). 
Conclusions 
Though HIS integration in developing countries has been recognized as the basis for coordination and linkage across 
health programs, achieving that goal is quite a challenge. The complex contextual realities of the health sector in these 
countries as in our case provoke lots of challenges in the efforts to change existing systems. These challenges as the 
paper showed, results partly from the poor state of local authorities and the multiplicity of actors, rendering the HIS 
context a battle ground where different competing and overlapping interests by the various actors are at play. In our case, 
this is epitomized by the tensions between the national authorities pushing for HIS integration and vertical programs 
supported by donors resulting from the asymmetric ownership and control of resources.  
Using the Structuration theory concepts we have shown how actors drew on resources to exercise power over each other, 
which ultimately constituted to organizational structures of domination. The fact that each main actor has resources and 
knowledgeable enough to wield power over the other actor leading to dialectic of control (Giddens, 1984); paradoxically 
means neither side is in control in any strict sense. The paper proposed the need to strongly build meaning of the HIS 
integration using communication processes and the use of modularized distributed control approach of the integrated HIS 
facilitating the ‘tapping on’ of the resources available to the various actors. The approach is more pragmatic in low 
income countries with strong quasi-independent vertical programs supported by myriads of donors. However, further 
research on the proposed approaches is needed to unravel the practical dynamics involved. 
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